Affective institutional work and ordoliberal governance : Gender equality in the parliamentary debates on the Competitiveness Pact in Finland by Kylä-Laaso, Miikaeli & Koskinen Sandberg, Paula
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=swom20
NORA - Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research
ISSN: 0803-8740 (Print) 1502-394X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/swom20
Affective Institutional Work and Ordoliberal
Governance: Gender Equality in Parliamentary
Debates on the Competitiveness Pact in Finland
Miikaeli Kylä-Laaso & Paula Koskinen Sandberg
To cite this article: Miikaeli Kylä-Laaso & Paula Koskinen Sandberg (2019): Affective
Institutional Work and Ordoliberal Governance: Gender Equality in Parliamentary Debates on the
Competitiveness Pact in Finland, NORA - Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research, DOI:
10.1080/08038740.2019.1697749
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/08038740.2019.1697749
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 17 Dec 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
ARTICLE
Aﬀective Institutional Work and Ordoliberal Governance: Gender
Equality in Parliamentary Debates on the Competitiveness Pact in
Finland
Miikaeli Kylä-Laaso and Paula Koskinen Sandberg
Gender Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
ABSTRACT
The 2008 economic crisis and its aftermath have created opportunities for
institutional actors to formulate and implement neoliberal reforms and
policies. In this article, we analyse a recent ordoliberal policy measure of
the Finnish government—namely, the Competitiveness Pact—and related
legislative measures. Ordoliberalism, a variant of neoliberalism, entails
a strong state which aims to protect the economy from interfering inﬂu-
ences. The government’s main objective was to increase the competitive-
ness of the Finnish economy by lowering labour costs. However, the
competitiveness measures caused a conﬂict between the government
and labour market parties. As the measures mainly targeted the feminized
public sector, they had clear gendered impacts that became central to the
struggle between the government and trade unions. We utilize critical
discourse analysis as a methodology to study aﬀective institutional work
and ordoliberal governance in parliamentary discussions on these mea-
sures. Our results show that gender equality was marginalized and con-
sidered a threatening issue for the ordoliberal regime. The Pact was also
the government’s attempt to make institutional changes to the norms and
relations of the corporatist system, as the government assumed the lead-
ing role by setting demands for the labour market parties to fulﬁl.
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Introduction
Responses to the economic crisis of 2008 have seen intensifying neoliberal policies in combination
with a more authoritarian approach to governance, demanding and even forcing sacriﬁces from the
people. Since the crisis, the Finnish economy has struggled with stagnation and growing public
debt, with no clear-cut solutions. Between 2008 and 2015, the Finnish government introduced
various austerity measures, which did not greatly impact this progress (Harjuniemi & Ampuja,
2019). By 2015, when parliamentary elections were looming in Finland, the political discourse was
ﬁlled with a sense of impending doom. Lack of competitiveness resulting from high wages and
growing public debt were deﬁned as key problems, to which the right-wing parties proposed the
solution of even more severe austerity. A key measure for this was the Competitiveness Pact, which
forms the case study of this paper.
The crisis and its aftermath also enabled institutional actors to formulate and implement neoliberal
and ordoliberal reforms and policies. The Competitiveness Pact was an attempt to decrease labour
costs and increase the competitiveness of the Finnish economy. It was initiated in 2015 by Prime
Minister Juha Sipilä’s centre-right-populist government (e.g. Elomäki, 2019) and negotiated with the
labour market parties. Along with the government’s austerity policies, the Pact had drastic gender
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implications for the labour market. The Pact was also an attempt by the government to implement
institutional changes to the norms and relations of the corporatist system. The government took
a leading role, setting demands for the labourmarket parties to fulﬁl with labour cost reductions as the
main goal. The government threatened to make further cuts of up to €10 billion and implement an
alternative competitiveness package—the so-called obligatory laws—which would bypass the labour
market parties’ agreements. Thus, the government had a great deal of weight behind its demands. In
this power struggle, gendered impacts of the competitiveness measures became a central issue of
debate.
Our main interest in this article lies in analysing how the government tried to change a central
institution—the corporatist system—and how it reacted to resistance and criticism of the gender
inequality that its policies would cause. The austerity and competitiveness measures can be under-
stood in the context of ordoliberal ideology, which entails the state’s active agency in promoting
a competitive national economy by protecting the markets from interfering inﬂuences (Bonefeld,
2012). In the case of the Pact, however, strong politicization came in the form of a critical focus on
gender equality. The gendered impacts of laws and the Pact were raised as a central issue by trade
unions, the opposition and scholars (Elomäki, Kantola, Koivunen, & Ylöstalo, 2016; Harjuniemi &
Ampuja, 2019; Jokinen, 2017).
For our analysis, we develop the concept of aﬀective institutional work. Institutional work
represents action directed towards “creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence,
Suddaby, & Leca, 2011). Our focus is on the aﬀective meaning-making and aﬀective economies
(Ahmed, 2004; Wetherell, 2013) in which this institutional work is embedded: the circulation and
use of emotions and their attachment to diﬀerent signs and objects, which played a central role in
the debates over the obligatory laws and the Pact. As the government endeavoured to secure the
legitimacy of its policies and take extraordinary actions in the labour markets, it also had to manage
the aﬀective economies of gendered issues, such as the tension between the female-dominated
public sector and male-dominated private sector, in the context of competitiveness. The concept of
aﬀective institutional work enables us to analyse how aﬀects were used to maintain and disrupt
institutions.
We have chosen to analyse the Finnish parliamentary discussions held during the years
2015–2017, covering the formation of the Pact. We employ critical discourse analysis of the aﬀective
institutional work and discourses employed by the government to defend its competitiveness-
promoting measures and the obligatory laws against gender equality–related criticism in particular.
Our research questions are as follows: (1) What kind of aﬀective institutional work did the
government do when defending and seeking to legitimize its competitiveness measures and their
gendered consequences? (2) How was the government’s aﬀective and discursive meaning-making
embedded in the changing corporatist system and ordoliberal governance?
Our research contributes to previous scholarship by presenting a sociological analysis of the state
as an active agent in the present-day Finnish ordoliberal competition state (e.g. Kantola & Kananen,
2013) as well as the status of gender equality in the state’s reforms. We seek to contribute to the
study of ordoliberal governance in the context of gender equality and corporatism by analysing the
discourse and aﬀects used to obtain consent for ordoliberal policies—that is, the aﬀective institu-
tional work. We also contribute to feminist studies of the economy by highlighting how economic
ideas of governance are embedded in aﬀective meaning-making and how aﬀects, in turn, inﬂuence
institutional change and economic governance.
Ordoliberal competition state, corporatism and the gendered labour market
Neoliberalism and its variant, ordoliberalism, are viewed as dominant ideologies in contemporary
Finnish society. These ideologies have challenged the more traditional social-democratic ideas often
linked to Nordic societies and welfare states. The general tendencies and features of neoliberalism
include deregulation, privatization and the state’s withdrawal from areas of social protection
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(Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2002). While the absence of state intervention in the market is central to
neoliberalism, in ordoliberalism, the state is an active agent enhancing market eﬃciency by
protecting the markets from political strife and the undue inﬂuence of the people (e.g. Miettinen,
2017).
Therefore, the context of this article is the ordoliberal competition state. Finland has experienced
two severe economic crises in recent decades: one in the 1990s (the national banking crisis) and the
other in 2008 (the global ﬁnancial crisis). In the aftermath of these crises, the global neoliberal
project gained legitimacy, thus facilitating the paradigm shift from the welfare state to the competi-
tion state (Kantola & Kananen, 2013; see also Elomäki et al., 2016). The Sipilä government in
particular moved the state towards ordoliberal governance (Adkins, Kortesoja, Mannevuo, &
Ylöstalo, 2019; Kantola & Kananen, 2013). As showcased in the formulation of the obligatory
laws of the Competitiveness Pact, the state tried to bypass the labour market parties and restrict
their freedom to negotiate—or force them to agree to the Pact—by implementing legislation.
To fully understand the Competitiveness Pact’s impact on gender equality, it is important to
closely examine the gendered structures and institutions of the Finnish labour market—namely,
the ordoliberal competition state and corporatism. Finland shares many features with other
Nordic countries, which are typically acknowledged as relatively gender-equal societies (e.g.
World Economic Forum, 2018). This characteristic is commonly attributed to the Nordic
women-friendly welfare state model (e.g. Borchorst & Siim, 2002; Hernes, 1987). However, the
dismantling of the social-democratic welfare state and adoption of the ordoliberal competition
state has had gendered consequences. Public sector services, which are at the core of the welfare
state and mainly employ women, have been subjected to strict budgetary control. Emphasis on
the competitiveness of the export industry has strengthened, and the public sector has been
portrayed as a burden, thus justifying the cutting of expenses (Kantola & Kananen, 2013). This
kind of rhetoric has been particularly pronounced since nurses managed to negotiate relatively
high wage increases in 2007, with most industries then following this example. The result was
a signiﬁcant rise in Finland’s labour costs, with unfortunate timing, just before the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis (e.g. Saari, Kantola, & Koskinen Sandberg, in press). The nurses’ wage increases in
particular and the 2007 collective bargaining round in general have been blamed for the loss of
national competitiveness.
All Nordic countries have high levels of gender segregation in the labour market, with Finland
having the highest level (Grönlund, Halldén, & Magnusson, 2016). Women in Finland tend to work
in the public sector, mainly the local government sector, while men typically work in the private
sector, speciﬁcally in the construction and export industries. The local government sector employs
approximately 420,000 people, which is a large number in a nation of only 5 million people. In the
local government sector, women comprise 80% of the labour force. Employees in feminized
occupations, such as nurses, early education personnel and teachers, all work for the local govern-
ment for relatively low pay (e.g. Koskinen Sandberg, Törnroos, & Kohvakka, 2018). The
Competitiveness Pact hit these people especially hard because it cut from their already modest
salaries.
Finland ranks as strongly corporatist according to various economic and political criteria, such
as high union density, interest groups’ active involvement in policy formation and centralized wage
bargaining (e.g. Bergqvist, 2004; Kauppinen, 2005; Vesa, Kantola, & Binderkrantz, 2018).
Corporatism is central to how the Finnish labour market and political decision-making are
organized. The labour market parties work in active collaboration with the Finnish governments
and exercise signiﬁcant decision-making power. This powerful position was the main reason why
Sipilä’s government aimed to change or at least dismantle the power of corporatism in Finland.
Typically, the government would have to gain acceptance from the labour market parties to
implement a labour market reform or policy, which would then be negotiated with the labour
market parties. For a policy measure to come into force, reaching consensus in the tripartite
framework is crucial. While this was also the case with the Competitiveness Pact, here, the
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government took on an exceptional leadership role and tried to dictate the formulation and
implementation of this labour market policy (see also Adkins et al., 2019).
The Competitiveness Pact and the obligatory laws
The Competitiveness Pact, initially called the Social Pact, was largely framed by the 2008 economic
crisis, which has had a lengthy aftermath. Research shows an unwillingness in Finnish media to
provide alternative viewpoints to the narrative oﬀered by hegemonic institutions, although there
were conﬂicting views on the state of Finnish labour’s competitiveness (Harjuniemi & Ampuja,
2019; Kaitila, 2019). While debate on austerity measures peaked in 2015, before the parliamentary
elections (e.g. Adkins et al., 2019), Finland had already adopted austerity measures some years
earlier, and the previous government had raised awareness of the crisis. The Ministry of Finance set
the terms of this debate and all major political parties accepted, rather uncritically, the Ministry’s
view that austerity was necessary to survive the crisis (Elomäki, 2019). According to Juha Sipilä of
the Centre Party, who became the Prime Minister, something needed to be done to “save the
country”, and Finland would face economic diﬃculties similar to those of Greece unless the reforms
were implemented (see also Adkins et al., 2019). Austerity measures and national competitiveness
were central to the strategic government programme, Finland—Land of Solutions (Prime Minister’s
Oﬃce, 2015).
The newly formed government consisted of the conservative Centre Party, the right-wing
National Coalition Party and the right-wing populist Finns Party, which later split into two parties,
with only roughly half of their representatives remaining in the government. As a solution to
economic challenges, the government came up with the Competitiveness Pact. The Pact was to be
negotiated between the state and the labour market parties, who were meant to determine the
practical implementation of the policy measures. The Pact’s central aim was to increase the
competitiveness of the Finnish economy (Prime Minister’s Oﬃce, 2015). This aim would be
achieved by either lowering labour costs by 5% or increasing work hours by 100 hours a year
(without pay increases)—demands that were diﬃcult for trade unions to accept. When the
negotiations did not produce results, the government began planning an alternative competitive-
ness package—also mentioned in the government programme—to enforce its goals. The package
would have prevented the labour market parties from negotiating some terms normally agreed
upon in collective agreements, which resulted in the adoption of the term “obligatory laws”.
To decrease labour costs and other expenses for employers, cuts would be made in several areas.
Increasing competitiveness was presented as a solution to the rising public debt and increasing state
expenditure for the sake of private business competitiveness was considered acceptable. The
government decided to reduce the social security contributions of employers by 1.72% and transfer
these costs to the state, changing some public holidays into unpaid ones and reducing payments for
employees on sick leave. Originally, the package also included cutting extra pay for overtime and
working on Sundays, but as these measures would have aﬀected the female-dominated sectors
harshly, they faced heavy criticism and were eventually replaced with the aforementioned holiday
pay cuts. This received less criticism despite its similar targeting of the public sector. Although the
public sector and the state were key in paying for this “productivity leap”, according to the
government, this was all done to “provide a sustainable basis for the funding of the welfare society”
(Finnish Government, 2015). The government also proposed measures which it framed as favour-
ing employers and gender equality, such as giving €2,500 in compensation to employers whose
employees took parental leave, which can be seen as a mostly symbolic act for the sake of gender
equality. These competitiveness measures were discussed often in the parliament during the Sipilä
government’s term.
Ultimately, the labour market parties reached a consensus on the Pact in spring 2016. The Pact
would involve cuts to certain pay components, such as cutting the holiday pay of public sector
employees for three years (approximately half a month’s extra salary that is paid annually), shifting
4 M. KYLÄ-LAASO AND P. KOSKINEN SANDBERG
social insurance contributions from employers to employees by 1.20%, shifting social security
payments from employers to the state by at least 0.58% and adding 24 extra unpaid annual working
hours (Competitiveness Pact, 2016). The Competitiveness Pact and the state’s role in enforcing it
were also connected to a discourse of the waning role of the corporatist system and centralized
collective bargaining, which were portrayed as historical remnants. According to Brown (2015) and
Adkins et al. (2019), this was an inversion of the traditional social contract: the government
demanded sacriﬁces from Finnish citizens in order to protect the Finnish economy and competi-
tiveness instead of protecting the citizens’ rights.
Methodology and data: aﬀective institutional work, discourse analysis and
parliamentary discussions
In this article, our methodological approach is situated within critical discourse analysis and the
research on aﬀects, grounded in the works of, for example, Ahmed (2004) andWetherell (2013). We
combine these approaches with research on institutional work to analyse how aﬀects are used and is
present in discursive meaning-making and how this, in turn, appears as part of the institutional
work of government in changing the corporatist system in Finland.
The starting point for analysing aﬀects is asking what aﬀects do in interaction and how these
interactions organize the social order (Ahmed, 2004). Utilizing the concept of aﬀective economy,
Ahmed discusses how aﬀects gain stickiness towards various objects, which come to be considered
as sources of these aﬀects. In her use, aﬀect refers to the circulation of emotions and their
attachment to objects and signs, which then shapes and organizes action and people. According
to Wetherell (2013), aﬀects, emotions and discourse are, in many ways, entangled as emotions are
negotiated, evaluated and performed as part of aﬀective/discursive meaning-making (on emotions
in discursive institutional work, see also Moisander, Hirsto, & Fahy, 2016). Therefore, we utilize
critical discourse analysis as our methodology, where the relationship between knowledge and
power is central—how knowledge is produced and with it both possibilities and limitations, in
terms of action and subjectivity (Kantola & Lombardo, 2017).
Institutions can be deﬁned as historical accumulations of practices (e.g. Scott, 2013). Institutions
set the conditions for future action. Feminist scholars have noted that institutions are gendered and
they reﬂect, reinforce and structure unequal power relations in society (e.g. Chappell & Waylen,
2013). For the purposes of our study, we coin the term aﬀective institutional work, which merges
concepts around institutional work (e.g. Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2011) and
aﬀect theory (e.g. Ahmed, 2004; Wetherell, 2013). Institutional work represents action directed
towards “creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (e.g. Lawrence et al., 2011). The
literature on institutional work has produced concepts such as disruptive institutional work
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), defensive institutional work (Maguire & Hardy, 2009) and temporal
institutional work (Granqvist & Gustafsson, 2016). We contribute to this literature by bringing in
elements of aﬀect theory. The concept of aﬀective institutional work allows for analysing how
institutional work is conducted via mobilizing aﬀects to create, maintain or disrupt institutions.
Our research data consist of plenary sessions of the Finnish parliament in 2015–2017, totalling
27 diﬀerent documents and approximately 400–450 pages. The discussions used are taken from
various stages of the process leading to the Competitiveness Pact. The data are available online and
were gathered from the Finnish parliament’s website (Finnish Government, n.d.), where the
material is stored. All plenary sessions are recorded and published online and referenced in the
analysis as PTK (abbreviation for minutes of the meeting). These data were chosen because our
interests are in the government’s aﬀective institutional work and ways of legitimizing its exceptional
actions and gendered policies. Although the views of the labour market parties are missing from the
data, they provide ample opportunities for analysing the government’s discourse, which is central to
our research questions. We selected the quotations according to their relevance to the subject:
although law or the Pact have been discussed often, the discussions where they were central and
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provoked dialogue were the most fruitful ones. We also aim to illuminate the issues that became
central in these discussions.
We begin our analysis by focusing on the obligatory laws and then move to the agreement over
the Pact. We pay attention to the aﬀective institutional work done by the government in the context
of ordoliberalism.What kinds of aﬀects relating to the obligatory laws and the Competitiveness Pact
are produced, ignored or elaborated, and what are their implications for gender equality?
Legitimizing ordoliberalism via aﬀective institutional work
The planning of the obligatory laws began in autumn 2015, when Prime Minister Sipilä ended
negotiations on the Competitiveness Pact with the labour market parties for the second time due to
the trade unions’ disagreement with the government’s goals. Both times, the negotiations were rather
short, and the tight time limits set by the government made reaching any agreement challenging
(Hirvola, 2017). These cuts would have had the most severe eﬀects on the female-dominated occupa-
tions in the public and service sectors. Facing resistance and criticism from trade unions, the opposition
and several academics (Elomäki et al., 2016; Hirvola, 2017), the government needed to create legitimacy
for both its exceptional actions in the corporatist system and the gendered eﬀects of its policies.
After the laws were announced, Prime Minister Sipilä took the unusual decision to deliver
a public speech on national television targeting all Finnish citizens and workers in the Finnish
labour market (YLE News, 2015). In his speech, he pleaded with the labour market parties to a ﬁnd
a solution, while expressing his understanding that part of the planned competitiveness package
would adversely aﬀect certain groups of employees, but that these cuts in wages and beneﬁts were
necessary for the common good.
When asked in the parliament about the gendered impacts of the laws and proposed cuts to extra
wages for overtime and working on Sundays, the government representatives mostly ignored the
issue and focused on the “big picture” of the economy. We will begin our analysis with talk about
this “big picture” and the aﬀective institutional work of the government regarding the gendered
impacts of the laws. According to Ahmed (2004), aﬀects are oriented towards diﬀerent objects
through encounters. The following quotations reveal the centrality of reorienting aﬀects from one
object to another to the government’s aﬀective institutional work. Opposition MP Aino-Kaisa
Pekonen (Left Alliance) had the following to say about the laws:
This is an unforeseen attack on the freedom of contract. The government’s cuts are directed towards low-wage
women, care sector and store workers . . . How does disciplining low-wage women increase the competitive-
ness of Finnish export industries? (PTK 31/2015)
In Pekonen’s comment, there is a clear focus on the intersection of class and gender. This is used to
evoke feelings of injustice, as the well-being of low-wage women in various sectors is largely
perceived to be sacriﬁced for the Finnish export industries. Low-wage women, and nurses in
particular, were a strong rhetorical device and ﬁgures used often to argue against the government’s
policies (Elomäki et al., 2016). This criticism is tied to the logic of the obligatory laws: not only are
low-wage women targeted unfairly, the government’s policy is also based on illegitimate goals and
means, as they would limit the labour market parties’ freedom of contract. Aﬀects relating to
injustice regarding gender equality and class are at the core here. However, Prime Minister Sipilä’s
response does not address these issues:
This entire package saves around 1.4 billion euros from the public sector. Part of this will be used to balance
the economy of the public sector and part will be used to decrease the social security payments of the private
sector, which increases the competitiveness of the private sector—this is the part that those with a job can do
for the unemployed. (PTK 31/2015)
Although Pekonen connects the laws to gender and the functioning of the corporatist system, Sipilä
mostly ignores both of these in favour of discussing the economy in general. This represents
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a common strategy in the government’s responses, which allowed it to focus on its ordoliberal
agenda. The ﬁrst part of Sipilä’s answer is rather technical, focused on describing the government’s
logic, while the second part focuses on the general category of employees without a gender
perspective. Despite the degree of technicality, a great deal of aﬀective institutional work is done
here.
Sipilä replaces the category of low-wage women by speaking about the public sector, which is
a considerably more abstract category with a diﬀerent range of aﬀects attached to it. The
comment relies on a discourse of a bloated or unhealthy public sector, which creates public
debt and, in turn, creating problems for competitiveness. The need for balance clearly indicates
that the public sector already has more than enough resources. Interest in better wages in the
public sector is also delegitimised because it would threaten increased employment. Despite being
heavily underpaid, the low-wage women are implicitly positioned as at least better oﬀ than the
unemployed. Discussing the demands of neoliberal policy, Brown (2015) indicates that rhetoric
about the public sector tends to be particularly accusatory and, following this, greater sacriﬁces
are asked of it. The aﬀective economy (Ahmed, 2004) of the public sector is somewhat diﬀerent
from that of a low-wage woman. As the public debt had been rising ever since the economic crisis
began, blame was directed at the public sector, despite the numerous layoﬀs during the crisis
(Jonker-Hoﬀrén, 2019).
Sipilä’s response consists mostly of not answering the key issues raised in the criticism, diverting
the related aﬀects elsewhere. Sipilä still had the following to say on the eﬀects of laws regarding the
distribution of wealth: “It is repulsive for me to think in the way that there is someone in this that
beneﬁts and someone who loses” (PTK 39/2015). For Sipilä, considering the conﬂicts, beneﬁts and
interests vested in the obligatory laws was “repulsive”. The use of this word implies a strong moral
and aﬀective stance; the consequences of the laws were ignored for the sake of evaluating the
government’s moral integrity. This, however, also positions other actors under the microscope. This
discourse suggests that labour market parties that are unwilling to accept the competitiveness
measures or other parties that are critical of the laws are acting unethically for the sake of group
interests. Disruptive institutional work can happen by undermining the moral foundations of the
institution (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), which is central to the discourse shown above, as the trade
unions and other actors showing resistance are implicitly regarded as questionable in their
criticism.
Labour market parties were to blame for gendered impacts of the competitiveness package,
according to the government. Facing questions about whether the government actually had a right
to make the obligatory laws, Sipilä said the following: “Of course we would have wanted to agree
about it together—then we would have been able to better take into account diﬀerent economic
sectors. But no will was found for this” (PTK 31/2015). This indirectly justiﬁes the government’s
gendered policies while accusing the trade unions of preventing the government from designing
better policies. Thus, the government is claiming to have no alternatives to its position and
positioning itself simultaneously as a victim of unwilling trade unions and a saviour doing what
needs to be done regardless.
This latter discourse is apparent in the following words of Sampo Terho of the populist Finns
Party: “None of the means the government has proposed for increasing competitiveness are
ideological. The only ideology the government has is saving Finland” (PTK 42/2015)—requiring
the participation of all Finns. The discourse of competitiveness is rather nationalistic, where the
sacriﬁces required from the people are also constructed as being for the greater good. This
constitutes a form of aﬀective institutional work similar to that above by questioning the moral
foundations of other actors. Yet it also provides a hopeful future. It is possible to save Finland, but
Finland now needs everyone to do their part. This discourse relies strongly on a nationalistic
aﬀective economy and, therefore, love and fear—the implication being that if nothing is done to
“save Finland”, there will be severe and incalculable consequences. Indeed, the “way of Greece” is
central to this discourse, and it entails fear of a failed economy and loss of national autonomy to the
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EU. This is used to generate emotional and moral uncertainty about the future (e.g. Brown, 2015)
and, largely, also positions everyone as equally responsible for the future.
The quotations above are deeply embedded in ordoliberal ideology. Most of the aﬀective
institutional work is directed towards establishing the legitimacy of the government’s actions and
delegitimising the corporatist system or other actors, portraying them as representing illegitimate
group interests. The government, meanwhile, is looking after the economy as a whole and, thus,
after Finland itself. Aﬀective economies (Ahmed, 2004) used rely on the stickiness of fears, doubts
and suspicions regarding the public sector or the corporatist system: the discourse of an excessively
large public sector causing debt or the corporatist system being outdated and unable to do anything
but work for group interests. Responses to the policies’ gendered eﬀects are then reoriented and re-
categorized, resulting in very diﬀerent aﬀective economies being evoked from those relating to low-
wage women. According to Ahmed (2004), emotion and aﬀects might be valued diﬀerently
depending on what they are orientated towards. At the core is the illegitimacy of the aﬀects and
emotions of low-wage women because they are not directed towards what is constructed as the
common interest of “saving Finland” but, instead, are even portrayed and evaluated as harmful.
Government as a proponent of gender equality: values and aﬀects
Despite these attempts to shift the conversation away from gender, gender equality became
increasingly focal issues in the debates about the obligatory laws, perhaps partly because the aﬀects
and interests of low-wage women and other targets of the cuts were not recognized. The govern-
ment showed resilience in defending the obligatory laws and austerity policies, but admitted to
issues relating to gender equality in the proposed cuts to extra pay for overtime and working on
Sundays. The government eventually replaced this proposal with cuts to holiday pay, although these
were also gendered to some degree, disproportionately targeting the public sector. With these
changes, the government started to position itself as a proponent of gender equality, in contrast to
the labour market parties. The €2,500 compensation for employers whose employees took parental
leave also became central to the government’s discourse. As aﬀective institutional work, the
government’s values became central to managing and creating its legitimacy, constructing an
image of a righteous actor.
The eventually withdrawn cuts to overtime and Sunday pay had faced substantial criticism from
the opposition, trade unions and researchers, but the government had remained unresponsive (e.g.
Elomäki et al., 2016; Hirvola, 2017). What ultimately changed the government’s position was
a televised interview with two midwives, who discussed how the cuts impacted their personal
lives. Sipilä then claimed that their arguments had convinced him of the negative consequences of
the planned cuts. Sipilä went on to portray the replacement cuts in holiday pay as an achievement of
the government, saying that the government had “truly searched for alternative options. We turned
every stone until we found a better way” (PTK 42/2015). This discourse emphasized that it would
not be the government’s fault if policies caused gender inequalities. Instead, Petri Honkonen of the
Centre Party referred to the history of corporatism, where labour market parties had been unable to
make progress regarding gender equality:
From the perspective of equality, I’m grateful in particular for this equality leap, where the expenses of parental
leave are compensated by €2,500, levelling the inequalities faced by young women in the labour markets—
despite that the male-dominated labour market parties have tried to prevent this for years. (PTK 42/2015)
Thus, the values and goals of the labour market parties were directly questioned, casting suspicion
on their interest in gender equality. Instead, there was an “equality leap” made by the government,
associated with the “competitiveness leap” that was also the government’s goal. Our data reveal that
this compensation became a central part of the government’s discourse, showcasing its capacity for
considering gender equality. The aﬀective economy of disappointment related to the failures of the
corporatist system was utilized to delegitimise the labour market parties’ actions. This worked to
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disrupt the moral foundations of the labour market parties, as they were constructed as having no
real interest in gender equality.
The government was portrayed as determined in its task, but the limitations set by the labour
market parties still determined its possibilities. Hanna-Maja Henriksson of the Swedish People’s
Party of Finland demanded better gender impact assessments for the obligatory laws, and Timo
Heinonen of the National Coalition Party responded that they must be done carefully, but hoped
that “a solution would still be found together with the labour market parties” (PTK 42/2015), as
there would be more tools for taking equality into account.
A fundamental diﬀerence was also constructed in the issue of representation, where the
government claimed to be the only actor with the interests of the people in mind, unlike the
trade unions, who represented mere group interests. This can be seen in the case of midwives: while
the midwives’ views were taken seriously, the other actors’ (e.g. the opposition, trade unions and
academics) criticisms of the cuts were ignored. The following comment demonstrates Laura
Huhtasaari of the Finns Party justifying the fastidiousness of the government:
The opposition has so many things it says “no” to. If you say “no” to everything, it leads to Finland becoming
a periphery, and the country withers. We do not ask the opposition or the professors whether we are allowed
to lead this country or not. We lead this country. A good leader listens to the people, and even that seemed to
be a problem for you. The government listened to a midwife, who gave a reasonable argument. (PTK 42/2015)
The criticism of the government’s choices was perceived as an unwillingness to accept the need to
make changes. While attacking the opposition is not extraordinary, interestingly, academic actors,
such as professors, were likened to the opposition, making their knowledge political and ideological.
The government and Prime Minister Sipilä had already demonstrated hostility towards academics
opining on the government’s policies (Vuorelma, 2017), and Huhtasaari’s comment above follows
this line. As depoliticizing political issues is a central aspect of ordoliberal policymaking (Miettinen,
2017), politicizing criticism can be a useful tool for portraying others as ideological actors.
The central elements of this aﬀective institutional work derive from struggles over authenticity
and values: which actors can actually be true to their word? The emphasis on the government’s
ability to make tough but fair decisions shifted the discourse from the actual consequences of these
policies to the government’s moral integrity and values—a phenomenon apparent in the govern-
ment’s equality policies too (Elomäki et al., 2016). Utilizing the aﬀects attached to midwives, the
government sought to present itself as aligned with the will of the “people”. The goal was for
negative aﬀects to be associated with trade unions instead of the government and, thus, for the
actions and knowledge of the former to be delegitimised.
After the obligatory laws: consensus trumping gender equality
While gender equality was, for a while, a prominent feature of the arguments of both the govern-
ment and labour market parties, the issue quickly disappeared once both sides ﬁnally found
common ground regarding the contents of the Competitiveness Pact. However, the results were
even more gendered than the initial plans had been. Having achieved its goals, the government
began to distance itself from the Pact. Indeed, in our data, there is markedly less discussion about
the Pact and even less about its gendered eﬀects. This is understandable to a degree, as the content
of the Pact was mostly left to the labour market parties to resolve. Yet the distancing is still
somewhat surprising because the government was a central actor demanding the Pact.
At the beginning of 2016, an agreement on the Pact was made, and it was later signed in the
spring and summer (The Competitiveness Pact, 2016). Pressure to reach this agreement had grown
as the government continued working on the obligatory laws, and the ongoing struggle was starting
to harm the labour market parties as well as the government (Hirvola, 2017). Additionally,
according to the labour market parties, President Sauli Niinistö had invited key leaders among
them to a meeting, indicating that he thought the negotiations should continue (YLE News, 2018).
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President Niinistö was, and remains, highly popular in Finland, with a particularly positive image of
a humble yet sharp and sensible centrist statesman, who is just like any other Finn. This meeting
presumably aﬀected the trade unions’ willingness to negotiate. Normally, presidents do not inter-
vene in domestic or labour market politics, making the move exceptional.
Despite including many diﬀerent means for increasing competitiveness, the Pact targeted the
female-dominated public sector in particular with a temporary 30% cut in holiday pay. The labour
market parties also agreed on the “Finnish model”, according to which wage increases in other
sectors would follow those in the export industries, freezing the wage gap between female- and
male-dominated sectors (Jonker-Hoﬀrén, 2019). This was a demand of the government because the
male-dominated export sector was presented as key to increasing competitiveness. The government
mostly celebrated the Pact as a great achievement, which the trade unions and the opposition saw as
insensitive to those aﬀected by the cuts. In response to criticism, Sipilä expressed his “humblest
gratitude” to the trade unions and the people for their sacriﬁces, while distancing the government
from the Pact:
If I say a word about this detail, I think it [the holiday pay cut] should have aﬀected everybody. But the labour
market parties have come to this outcome, and I respect that, and we have accepted it from our side. (PTK 18/2016)
Rather than positioning itself as an actor with power or inﬂuence, the government constructed the
role of spectator for itself. Even if there were gendered eﬀects, any criticism against the government
was ultimately aimed in the wrong direction. Removing itself from the position of responsibility was
a key strategy for the government after the Pact was agreed on. At the same time, the signiﬁcance of
the gendered cuts was referred to as a “detail” and was, thus, downplayed. This essentially meant
that the labour market parties agreeing to the Pact should take higher priority than gender equality.
Now that the corporatist system was tied to the Pact, the government began focusing on defensive
institutional work (e.g. Maguire & Hardy, 2009). The inequalities were recognized, but in a way that
sought silent submission and resignation for the sake of the Pact and peace among the corporatist
actors. Negative aﬀects became something to be simply accepted, even if the criticism had
a legitimate basis.
Later on, the labour market parties actually claimed that the government had outright demanded
the cuts to holiday pay (YLE News, 2017), which reignited the issue. This produced no changes in
the government’s stance, though, with Minister of Finance Petteri Orpo (National Coalition Party)
having the following to say: “If the labour market parties and those who they represent had not
accepted this, then they would not have accepted [the Pact]. They agreed on this and their
representatives signed the Pact” (PTK 99/2017). The power of the government was limited to
simply setting the agenda. In an ordoliberal fashion, what was agreed, and thus binding, was
considered to be more important than dissenting voices, which were ignored owing to their
presumed acceptance of the Pact.
Conclusion
In this article, we aimed to analyse the recent Finnish ordoliberal policy measure, the
Competitiveness Pact, initiated by Prime Minister Sipilä’s centre-right-populist government. Our
main interest lay in analysing how the government tried to change an institution (the Finnish
corporatist system and its dynamics) and how it reacted to the resistance to, and criticism of, the
gender inequalities that its policies would cause when implemented. We utilized critical discourse
analysis as a methodology to study aﬀects, gender equality and ordoliberal governance in parlia-
mentary discussions on the government’s competitiveness measures.
We contribute to the literature on institutional work (e.g. Lawrence et al., 2011) by bringing in
elements of aﬀect theory (e.g. Ahmed, 2004; Wetherell, 2013) to develop the concept of aﬀective
institutional work, which allows for analysing how institutional work is conducted via mobilizing
aﬀects to create, maintain or disrupt institutions. We also contribute to feminist studies of the
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economy by showcasing how economic ideas of governance are embedded in aﬀective meaning-
making and how aﬀects, in turn, inﬂuences economic governance and, ultimately, gender equality.
Although the government’s road to the Competitiveness Pact was not straightforward, Adkins
et al. (2019) argue that the approach was nonetheless successful. The threat of bypassing the
corporatist system ended up bending the labour market parties to the government’s will. Our ﬁndings
show that in the case of the Competitiveness Pact, aﬀective institutional work played a central role in
downplaying the issue of gender equality. When negative gender impacts came up in parliamentary
discussions, aﬀective institutional work was used to reorient negative aﬀects relating to gender
equality. Thus, the government used aﬀective institutional work to evade criticism and delegitimise
the labour market parties and their agendas. Gender equality became mostly a symbolic issue. This is
perhaps reﬂected in the lack of discussion about the Finnish model—an export industry–led wage
bargaining model which essentially works as a brake on public sector wages and which has almost
gained acceptance among central actors, although some trade unions representing feminized occupa-
tions continue to protest (Jonker-Hoﬀrén, 2019).
The legacy of the Competitiveness Pact is controversial. Its impact on the feminized public
sector, which manifested in the statistics soon after the Pact’s implementation, was severe. Wages
stagnated, especially in the already low-paid local government sector, and the 30% cuts to public
sector employees’ holiday pay also aﬀected annual earnings (Statistics Finland, 2017). Austerity
measures have been found to have gendered impacts in several national contexts (e.g. Elomäki,
2019; Kantola & Lombardo, 2017; Karamessini & Rubery, 2014), and Finland is no exception. The
overall gender impacts of the Sipilä government’s economic policy have been negative, with men
beneﬁting more from the implemented economic reforms and women more often suﬀering
negative consequences (Elomäki et al., 2018).
Despite the negative gender impacts, some, including several economists and politicians, con-
sider the Competitiveness Pact a success. It might be partly the result of lucky timing, but some
positive developments have been observable in the Finnish labour market; for example, the
employment rate rose signiﬁcantly (e.g. Economic Policy Council, 2019; Talouselämä, 2017).
Nonetheless, the Pact was very unpopular among the Finnish people, and it took a toll on Sipilä’s
political career and the popularity of his Centre Party, which suﬀered a rather dramatic defeat in the
2019 parliamentary elections.
The case of the Competitiveness Pact clearly indicates that in the Finnish ordoliberal competi-
tion state, the economic and competitiveness agenda is viewed as a primary objective, while gender
equality is but a secondary objective—if at all. This has been the trend for quite some time, but it
certainly has been intensiﬁed by the combination of ordoliberal governance and an entrepreneurial
leadership style, characteristic of the Sipilä government’s term. Since the strong competitiveness
agenda has also provoked negative aﬀects, it will be interesting to witness what kind of stance the
current government, in oﬃce since spring 2019, will take on the relationship between gender
equality and national competitiveness.
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